It has been theorized (though still of great debate) that the massive sheet of flame seen in the illustration described by most accounts was the 4 inch ammunition going off, and in doing so caused a fire that reached the powder magazines.
To quote wikipedia (not the most reliable source, I am aware, but still a valid one):
"It has been suggested from examination of the wreckage, found in 2001, that the magazine explosion in the 4 in (100 mm) armament near the mainmast caused the vertical blast of flame seen there, and this in turn ignited the magazines of the aft 15 in (380 mm) guns that caused the explosion that wrecked the stern. This explosion might have travelled through the starboard fuel tanks, igniting the fuel oil there, setting off the forward magazines and completing the destruction of the ship."
This quote was taken from their page on the Battle of the Denmark Strait. This forensic analysis seems to make a good deal of sense, and corroborates eyewitness accounts.
Not to get too silly here, but it's almost like a classic murder: do the crime, then blame it on your "co-worker" whilst you get away scott-free!
The biggest problem with analysis is the first hand witness reports from the first inquiry and investigation into her loss were not retained. A second, more comprehensive, investigation was launched months later. These are the RN witness reports we have to use. Many are contradictory. Some were completely disregarded by the admiralty as flights of fancy.
Most likely scenario is a penetration of 7" belt to explode in, or near the rear 4" mags to set in motion a chain deflagration of magazines.
Other scenarios like the torpedo room theory have virtually no chance of being the smoking gun.
However, other scenarios cannot be completely ruled out.
She did achieve the hit that started the boat deck fire. The possibility of that subsequent fire causing her loss is very small assuming the 4" mag hoists and safety interlocks were not damaged during the battle and that were secured before battle. This also assumes fuel and ammunition was stored properly.
What could be seen of the fire, and of what was reported of its seriousness leads to the probability of it not being the cause.
However, we will never really know what was going on inside Hood. Were her hoists damaged? Was a fire raging internally? Was her ammunition properly stored? Was fuel present?
How about this scenario: Eugen hits Hood, setting it afire. Bismarck hits Hood, damaging her safety systems for the 4 inch ammunition, the flash fire of 4 inch ammunition starts and makes it to Hood's magazine. Bismarck may have landed a hit that turned a bad situation into a catastrophic one.
Right you are. I'm not trying to make any lofty claims of British superiority, just that from what I have read their crews were far better trained and led
Yes your right on that; To me a free man will aways find a way to overcome his trails, before an indoctrinated one. On a lighter note read your game against striker IJN vs RN thought you build was good; just tweaked it a bit saved 2 its on DD's and 9pts on Gloster's for a Martlet and Hurricane Crushed the IJN build just not enough ships my Marlets were killing every thing in the air just lucky i guess. Going to tweak IJN try again. Fun reading it and try it.
About the RM sailors/crew - more than half the enlisted men in the Italian navy were volunteers on four year enlistments. These weren't your slave rowers on board triremes here...
After researching the Italian 381 mm (15 inch) gun used aboard the Littorio class, I discovered that these guns were actually very accurate and devastating, but they had a critical flaw, more so than the barrel life issue. The shells the guns were tested with were the most premium shells (again to generate impressive stats), while the shells the ships usually fired were poorer in quality. This differed from most other nations, which used the shells they tested on their ships.
One instance in which this was actually noticeable was in a battle where Vittorio Veneto and Littorio were firing their guns and Littorio's shots were all of a sudden incredibly accurate compared to VV. This was attributed to some of the superior shells coming through the cycle.
I think my analysis of crew gunnery training was poor. Here is a passage from Mark Stille's work on Italian Battleships of the Second World War that should provide clarity for everyone here:
"The main armament of Italian battleships was impressive on paper, especially the outstanding range and penetrating power of the new 15-inch gun. However, it is important to note that Italian battleship guns did not sink a single enemy ship during the war. The high muzzle velocity of the 15-inch gun caused excessive barrel wear, and therefore contributed to the persistent Italian problem of salvo dispersion. Maximum barrel life was some 120 rounds, much less than other nations' 15-inch guns. Dispersion was also increased by excessive manufacturing tolerances, both of the guns themselves and the ammunition they used. The salvo dispersion problem was even more prevalent for the re-bored 12.6-inch guns mounted on the four older battleships. These had a barrel life of only 150 rounds."
Not sure my analysis was incorrect after all. I was reading through a book called "Naval Firepower" by the brilliant naval analyst Norman Friedman in which he wrote the following:
"Although Italian fire-control design was excellent, not enough was ever invested to make Italian naval gunnery effective. By March 1935 the Italians were working on a dual-purpose fire control system, but it appears never to have been completed. Guns suffered from excessive dispersion. Training was unrealistic, exercises were limited, and war stocks were not amassed."
Formerly "Admiral Jacky Fisher."
"It follows then as certain as that night succeeds the day, that without a decisive naval force we can do nothing definitive, and with it, everything honorable and glorious"--George Washington
I think my analysis of crew gunnery training was poor. Here is a passage from Mark Stille's work on Italian Battleships of the Second World War that should provide clarity for everyone here:
"The main armament of Italian battleships was impressive on paper, especially the outstanding range and penetrating power of the new 15-inch gun. However, it is important to note that Italian battleship guns did not sink a single enemy ship during the war. The high muzzle velocity of the 15-inch gun caused excessive barrel wear, and therefore contributed to the persistent Italian problem of salvo dispersion. Maximum barrel life was some 120 rounds, much less than other nations' 15-inch guns. Dispersion was also increased by excessive manufacturing tolerances, both of the guns themselves and the ammunition they used. The salvo dispersion problem was even more prevalent for the re-bored 12.6-inch guns mounted on the four older battleships. These had a barrel life of only 150 rounds."
Not sure my analysis was incorrect after all. I was reading through a book called "Naval Firepower" by the brilliant naval analyst Norman Friedman in which he wrote the following:
"Although Italian fire-control design was excellent, not enough was ever invested to make Italian naval gunnery effective. By March 1935 the Italians were working on a dual-purpose fire control system, but it appears never to have been completed. Guns suffered from excessive dispersion. Training was unrealistic, exercises were limited, and war stocks were not amassed."
Something I posted in the RM vs RN Med' post. Just directly copying my entry as it's still relevant:
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Some context and clarification around what I'm perceiving as comments about the RM inadequacy:
For e.g. the Regia Marina practiced a different gunnery doctrine than the British especially in daylight, focusing on range and early hits. Vincent P O'Hara has commented that if you take all the daylight surface actions and add up the damage inflicted by each side, you’ll find that the Italians damaged more ships than did the British.
Lack of radar was a handicap, sure. Same goes with sonar but Italian anti-sub forces managed to perform credibly without it.
About the fuel shortage, I've mentioned in a previous post, where at the signing of the armistice, more than half of the fuel reserves the RM had were actually in the ships...
Also, the RM units were in general, less efficient than their Brit counterparts.
About the training and experience of the crew and admiralty - I've already commented on another post than more than half the RM crew were volunteers on 4 year enlistments.
Most military organisations require time to perform effectively, a "shaking out" as it were. The RN had around 9 months head start in the Med war, ironing out "peace time" kinks etc. The RM didn't have that "easing in" period.
About breaking the codes/naval intelligence - the Brits broke the German ciphers (many relating to convoy traffic to Africa) but did not break the RM ciphers. In reverse, the Italians penetrated many British codes. The Brits enjoyed a significant advantage in this regard and the relative failure of the RN to make a greater impact than they did could be considered an Italian victory, when remembering that the RMs' primary mission was getting the convoys through, and stopping the convoys was one of the RN's major priorities.