Also keep in mind that the RM was always short on fuel supply. They had to be very deliberate in their ship movements. Getting the convoys through was top priority. They didn't have the fuel reserves to just steam around on routine patrols.
A great example of this Weeds, is that at the time of the surrender in 1943, almost half of the fleet's oil reserve were onboard their ships.
That's... a very poor situation.
Tee
Ouch! Of course we can also blame the Italians for doing so poorly in North Africa they never got close to a significant oil supply. They had to get it from Germany, and Hitler was not in a good position to send more at the rate he was using it on the Eastern front. And many historians will argue that if Hitler had launched Operation Barbarossa on time instead of delaying 6 weeks to bail out the Italians first, the Germans might have succeeded in capturing Moscow.
What if....
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Some context and clarification around what I'm perceiving as comments about the RM inadequacy:
For e.g. the Regia Marina practiced a different gunnery doctrine than the British especially in daylight, focusing on range and early hits. Vincent P O'Hara has commented that if you take all the daylight surface actions and add up the damage inflicted by each side, you’ll find that the Italians damaged more ships than did the British.
Lack of radar was a handicap, sure. Same goes with sonar but Italian anti-sub forces managed to perform credibly without it.
About the fuel shortage, I've mentioned in a previous post, where at the signing of the armistice, more than half of the fuel reserves the RM had were actually in the ships... Also, the RM units were in general, less efficient than their Brit counterparts.
About the training and experience of the crew and admiralty - I've already commented on another post than more than half the RM crew were volunteers on 4 year enlistments. Most military organisations require time to perform effectively, a "shaking out" as it were. The RN had around 9 months head start in the Med war, ironing out "peace time" kinks etc. The RM didn't have that "easing in" period.
About breaking the codes/naval intelligence - the Brits broke the German ciphers (many relating to convoy traffic to Africa) but did not break the RM ciphers. In reverse, the Italians penetrated many British codes. The Brits enjoyed a significant advantage in this regard and the relative failure of the RN to make a greater impact than they did could be considered an Italian victory, when remembering that the RMs' primary mission was getting the convoys through, and stopping the convoys was one of the RN's major priorities.
If the information provided about the Giulio Cesare going shot for shot with Warspite in the early stages of Calabria is accurate, and it would appear that it is, I think that opens a door of possibilities for an Italian naval victory. By no means a guarantee, but a chance.
Some context and clarification around what I'm perceiving as comments about the RM inadequacy:
For e.g. the Regia Marina practiced a different gunnery doctrine than the British especially in daylight, focusing on range and early hits. Vincent P O'Hara has commented that if you take all the daylight surface actions and add up the damage inflicted by each side, you’ll find that the Italians damaged more ships than did the British.
Lack of radar was a handicap, sure. Same goes with sonar but Italian anti-sub forces managed to perform credibly without it.
About the fuel shortage, I've mentioned in a previous post, where at the signing of the armistice, more than half of the fuel reserves the RM had were actually in the ships... Also, the RM units were in general, less efficient than their Brit counterparts.
About the training and experience of the crew and admiralty - I've already commented on another post than more than half the RM crew were volunteers on 4 year enlistments. Most military organisations require time to perform effectively, a "shaking out" as it were. The RN had around 9 months head start in the Med war, ironing out "peace time" kinks etc. The RM didn't have that "easing in" period.
About breaking the codes/naval intelligence - the Brits broke the German ciphers (many relating to convoy traffic to Africa) but did not break the RM ciphers. In reverse, the Italians penetrated many British codes. The Brits enjoyed a significant advantage in this regard and the relative failure of the RN to make a greater impact than they did could be considered an Italian victory, when remembering that the RMs' primary mission was getting the convoys through, and stopping the convoys was one of the RN's major priorities.
Tee
Excellent summary.
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Im not sure if its in 'the battle for the middle sea' or not but another shortcoming the italians had to deal with was the limited capacity of the north african harbours. It made supplying rommel and the italian armies in NA very difficult.
Might have been that better facilities would have allowed larger, better defended convoys and RN might have had less success. Maybe